Works by Nishi Shah - PhilPapers
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Nishi Shah The Monist 85 (3): It is common for philosophers to claim that doxastic voluntarism, the view that an agent can form beliefs voluntarily, is false, and therefore that agents do not have the kind of control over their beliefs required for a straightforward application of deontological concepts such as obligation or duty in the domain of epistemology.
Nishi Shah, How truth governs belief - PhilPapers
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Nishi Shah. Philosophical Review 112 (4): (2003) Abstract Why, when asking oneself whether to believe that p, must one immediately recognize that this question is settled by, and only by, answering the question whether p is true? Truth is not an optional end for first-personal doxastic deliberation, providing an instrumental or extrinsic reason that an agent may take or …
Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman, Doxastic deliberation ...philpapers.org › rec › SHADD
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Believing that p, assuming that p, and imagining that p involve regarding p as true—or, as we shall call it, accepting p. What distinguishes belief ...
Belief and Truth: A Skeptic Reading of Plato - Katja Maria Vogt -...
books.google.co.uk
Katja Maria Vogt's Belief and Truth: A Skeptic Reading of Plato explores a Socratic intuition about the difference between belief and knowledge. Beliefs —...
Evidentialism and the Will to Believe - Scott Aikin - Google Books
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Work on the norms of belief in epistemology regularly starts with two touchstone essays: W.K. Clifford's
The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social - Google Books
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How do people form beliefs, and how should they do so? This book presents seventeen new essays on these questions, drawing together perspectives from...
Google Groups: as: preview of the third term of the 131st session
: ... knowledge and belief in posterior analytics gail fine, cornell university 21 june the mental and the normative nishi shah, amherst college ...
Google Groups: podcasts: aim of belief; metarepresentation; onora o'neill; jerry ...
: ... anandi hattiangadi, paul horwich, david papineau, nishi shah, ralph wedgwood, timothy williamson. http://www.csmn.uio.no/podcast/aim-of-belief/ more ...
Google Groups: the aim of belief: final call for respondents
: ... david papineau (king’s college, london) ● nishi shah (amherst) ●
10 Myths About Beliefs « Ethical Realism
ethicalrealism.wordpress.com
All this is pretty standard since Williams' canonical paper of 'Deciding to Believe' and has been then continuously refined (recently in interesting ways by Nishi Shah and David Velleman). This is however not what my ...
All web results to the name "Nishi Shah"
Philosophy, et cetera: Does Truth Govern Belief?
www.philosophyetc.net
But Nishi Shah, in 'How Truth Governs Belief', seems to have no sympathy for the distinction whatsoever. He holds that indicators of truth are the only relevant reasons when deliberating on what to believe. This strikes me as ...
Nishi Shah - The Raven Magazine
ravenmagazine.org
Nishi Shah About The Author. Nishi Shah is a professor of philosophy at Amherst College. The focus of much of his past published work is on the sense in which belief aims at truth. He is currently working on two book manuscripts: one, tentatively titled Complete Liberty: Lessons From John Stuart Mill; another, co-authored with Alexander George, defending a grammatical …
How Truth Governs Belief - Nishi Shah - The Philosophical Review...
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Nishi Shah. Pages How Truth Governs Belief. << Previous Article · Preview this Page in PDF · >> Next Article. Document is being loaded ... Not yet a ...
How Truth Governs Belief - Nishi Shah - The Philosophical Review ...
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Nishi Shah. Pages How Truth Governs Belief. << Previous Article · Preview this Page in PDF · >> Next Article. Document is being loaded ... Already a ...
(PDF) A New Argument for Evidentialism | Nishi Shah - Academia.edu
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Argues that resolving the central dispute in the ethics of belief between evidentialists and pragmatists turns on the …ct explanation of the first-personal...
Clearing Space For Doxastic Voluntarism - Nishi Shah - The Monist...
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Volume 85, Issue 3, July Controlling Belief. Nishi Shah. Pages DOI: monist Clearing Space For Doxastic Voluntarism.
Clearing Space for Doxastic Voluntarism | Nishi Shah - Academia.edu
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Clearing Space for Doxastic Voluntarismi It is common for philosophers to claim that doxastic voluntarism, the view that an agent can form beliefs voluntarily, is ...
Philosophy, et cetera: Reasons for Belief
www.philosophyetc.net
Nishi Shah.[2]. Can there be reasons for belief that are not reasons for the truth of the thing believed? The negative response has some intuitive ...
(PDF) Can Reasons for Belief be Debunked? | Nishi Shah - Academia.edu
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By Nishi Shah. A sequel to ‘A New Argument for Evidentialism.’ This time I defend the evidentialist not against the pragmatist, who thinks that there are...
(PDF) How Truth Governs Belief | Nishi Shah - Academia.edu
www.academia.edu
By Nishi Shah. Why is the first-personal deliberative question whether to believe that p transparent to the question whether p? I argue that Velleman’s...
ON TRANSPARENCY: A RESPONSE TO NISHI SHAH'S “HOW TRUTH GOVERNS ...
cdr.lib.unc.edu
In his paper “How Truth Governs Belief” Nishi Shah claims that within ...
Reasons belief | Epistemology and metaphysics | Cambridge University...
www.cambridge.org
This collection addresses foundational questions about reasons for belief and uses new research to explore traditional epistemological concerns.
Normativity of belief and epistemic agency workshop - Welcome
normativityofbeliefworkshop.weebly.com
Nishi Shah (Amherst College) Fernando Broncano (Universidad Carlos III, Madrid) Speakers and Commentators Jason D’Cruz (SUNY Albany) Miguel Angel Fernández
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